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GENERAL GOVERNMENT

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FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i)(1) -  
Intelligence Sources and Methods

ARGENTINA

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REFERENCE OF  
20 APR 1985  
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

09-72-201

16 APR 31 1985

PAGE 2

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WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~ WNINTEL

DIST: 02 APRIL 1985

COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

SUBJ: SITUATION IN THE ARMED FORCES (FFAA)

1. INCREASED TENSION IN THE ARMED FORCES AND BETWEEN  
THE FFAA AND THE ADMINISTRATION;
2. LACK OF AN FFAA LEADER WHO COULD PULL TOGETHER  
OPPOSITION TO THE ADMINISTRATION;
3. EXPECTATION OF INCREASING TENSION

EO25x1

PAGE 3

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EO25x1

TEXT: 1. BY THE END OF THE FOURTH WEEK OF MARCH 1985, A SIGNIFICANT AND ALARMING LEVEL OF TENSION EXISTED IN THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES (FFAA) AND BETWEEN THE FFAA AND THE CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION. CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE IS COMING FROM MIDDLE- AND LOWER-RANKING OFFICERS FOR THE FFAA TO STIFFEN INSTITUTIONAL OPPOSITION TO THE ADMINISTRATION. THIS PRESSURE COMES FROM A WIDELY-SPREAD BASE THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY; IT DOES NOT COME FROM JUST ONE OR A FEW LOCATIONS -- CORDOBA OR GREATER BUENOS AIRES, FOR EXAMPLE -- AS HAS OCCURRED IN PAST CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN THE FFAA AND A GIVEN ADMINISTRATION.

2. NO ARMED FORCES OFFICER HAS YET SURFACED WITH THE QUALITIES NEEDED TO PULL TOGETHER, CONTROL, AND LEAD MILITARY OPPOSITION TO THE GOVERNMENT. NO ARMY GENERAL OFFICER NOR ANY OFFICER OF EQUIVALENT GRADE IN THE OTHER TWO SERVICES HAS SHOWN SUPPORT FOR, OR A WILLINGNESS TO UNDERTAKE, A COUP D'ETAT. THE ARMY'S COLONELS WHO ARE DUE FOR PROMOTION IN 1985 AND 1986 ARE THE BEST OFFICERS IN THE ARMY, HOWEVER, AND SEVERAL OF THEM HAVE TRUE LEADERSHIP QUAL-

3

PAGE 4

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WINSTON

ITIES. AMONG RETIRED ARMY GENERAL OFFICERS, RETIRED MAJOR GENERAL (MGEN) LUCIANO BENJAMIN ~~(X MENENDEZ)~~) RETAINS CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE

AMONG MIDDLE- AND LOWER-RANKING ACTIVE DUTY OFFICERS, BUT RETIRED BRIGADIER GENERAL (BG) RAMON ~~(X CAMPS)~~) DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR WITH ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL.

~~AGS~~

3. FFAA OFFICERS EXPECT THE TENSIONS IN THE ARMED FORCES AND BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES AND THE GOVERNMENT TO INCREASE EVEN MORE ONCE THE TRIALS OF THE JUNTA MEMBERS OF THE PRECEDING ARMED FORCES GOVERNMENT BEGIN. OFFICERS DO NOT SEE THE ISSUE AT STAKE AS ONE OF JUDGING THE FORMER JUNTA MEMBERS FOR THEIR LEADERSHIP OF THE COUNTERSUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGN OF THE 1970'S, BUT RATHER AS AN ISSUE OF USING THE TRIALS TO CONDEMN THE WAR AGAINST SUBVERSION.

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EO25x1

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EO25x1

B. A SITUATION WHICH ARISES FROM PROBLEMS OUTSIDE THE CONTROL OF, AND FROM INSTABILITY IN, THE FFAA ALWAYS LEADS IN ARGENTINA TO TALKING AND PLANNING AMONG VARIOUS GROUPS OF OFFICERS, BUT THE LACK OF KEY INGREDIENTS (MONEY, ORGANIZATION, AND LEADERSHIP) FREQUENTLY KEEP THESE GROUPS FROM MOVING TO AN ACTION STAGE. CURRENTLY, THOUGH, SOME GROUPS MAY HAVE BEGUN TO UNDERTAKE ACTIONS CONSISTENT WITH THEIR PLANS.

C. BECAUSE OF THE WIDELY-SPREAD BASES OF PRESSURE IN THE FFAA, THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE ARGENTINE COUP D'ETAT OF 1955 MIGHT

PAGE 6

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SERVE AS A TYPE OF SCENARIO FOR ANY FUTURE FFAA ACTIONS AGAINST THIS GOVERNMENT; THAT IS, A SERIES OF REBELLIONS OR MUTINIES, RATHER THAN ONE IMMEDIATE DIRECT EFFORT TO REMOVE THE PRESIDENT.

D. THE ARMY'S GENERAL OFFICERS AND ITS COLONELS HOLDING KEY TROOP-LEADING ASSIGNMENTS MUST TAKE CARE THAT THE PRESSURE FROM THE MIDDLE- AND LOWER-RANKING OFFICERS DOES NOT GET OUT OF HAND AND THAT THEY DO NOT LOSE CONTROL OF THESE OFFICERS.

E. ULTRA-RIGHT PARAMILITARY GROUPS WHICH WORKED IN THE PAST WITH RETIRED GENERALS MENENDEZ AND CAMPS MAY WELL BE PUTTING PRESSURE ON SENIOR ARMY OFFICERS TO TAKE FIRM ACTION AGAINST PRESIDENT RAUL ((ALFONSIN)).

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REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~-~~UNINTEL~~

DIST: 02 APRIL 1985

COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

SUBJ: VIEWS [REDACTED] ON THE

SITUATION IN THE ARMY

1. LACK OF FOLLOW-UP PLANS TO SUPPORT INCREASED PLOTTING;
2. LACK OF RESPECT BY JUNIOR OFFICERS FOR GENERAL OFFICERS

TEXT: 1. [REDACTED]

EO25x1

PAGE 3

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[REDACTED] THERE HAS BEEN, [REDACTED] A CLEAR INCREASE  
IN PLOTTING ACTIVITY, TO INCLUDE INTENDED DESTABILIZING ACTIONS,  
BY THE FAR RIGHT OF THE ARGENTINE POLITICAL SPECTRUM. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] EVEN THOUGH A LOT OF TALK AND SOME ACTIONS HAVE  
TAKEN PLACE AND ARE CONTINUING, THIS TALK AND ACTIVITY FALL FLAT  
WITH THE ARMY COLONELS WHOSE PARTICIPATION IS REQUIRED WHEN THE  
WOULD-BE CONSPIRATORS ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THEY HAVE NO ACTION PLANS  
FOR FOLLOWING THROUGH ON THEIR PLOTTING. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] POLITICAL ADVISORS TO A SECOND-LEVEL POLITICIAN ARE INVOLVED WITH,  
AND ARE BEHIND, AN EFFORT TO DESTABILIZE THE GOVERNMENT. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE POLITICIAN IS ASSOCIATED WITH A NATIONAL FRONT MOVEMENT,  
WHICH INDICATED HE COULD HAVE BEEN REFERRING TO FORMER PRESIDENT  
ARTURO (ESPONDIZI) OR HERMINIO (IGLESIAS), THE LEADER OF THE  
OPPOSITION PERONIST JUSTICIALIST PARTY (PJ) ORGANIZATION IN BUENOS  
AIRES PROVINCE, WHO HAVE TALKED ABOUT WORKING TOGETHER POLITICALLY.

[REDACTED] THE RECENT REMARKS BY RETIRED MAJOR GENERAL JORGE  
HUGO (ARGUINDEGUI), A CHIEF OF THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF UNDER THE

ARG.

PAGE 4

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PRESENT ADMINISTRATION, REPRESENT A PART OF THE "POLITICAL ADVISORS'" EFFORT.

2. [REDACTED] DIVISIONS

EXIST IN THE ARMY'S OFFICER CORPS, ESPECIALLY BETWEEN JUNIOR OFFICERS AND THE GENERALS, WITH THE JUNIOR OFFICERS HAVING NO RESPECT FOR THE LATTER. [REDACTED] THE JUNIOR OFFICERS WOULD APPLAUD IF ALL THE CURRENT GENERAL OFFICERS WERE REPLACED.

3. [REDACTED] THE SITUATION IN

THE ARMY AS GRAVE. [REDACTED] BECAUSE OF A PROSPECT OF A BREAK-DOWN IN DISCIPLINE WHICH COULD ARISE IN PART FROM THE JUNIOR OFFICERS' LACK OF RESPECT FOR THE GENERALS, THERE EXISTS A REAL POSSIBILITY THAT THE SITUATION IN THE ARMY COULD GET OUT OF HAND.

4. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE ADMINISTRATION IS AWARE OF ON-GOING PLOTTING TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT; [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE ADMINISTRATION MAY ACT TO ALLEVIATE SOME OF THE CAUSES OF DISCONTENT IN THE ARMED FORCES AND PROBABLY WILL MOVE AGAINST SOME OF THE PLOTTERS, BUT ITS SKILL AND EFFECTIVENESS IN DOING SO

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ARE DIFFICULT TO ESTIMATE.)

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
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FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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PAGE 2

[REDACTED] S E C R E T [REDACTED]

W N I N T E L

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REPORT CLASS S E C R E T -- W N I N T E L [REDACTED]

DIST: 25 MARCH 1985

COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

SUBJ: WILLINGNESS OF THE ADMINISTRATION TO CONTINUE MAKING  
CHANGES IN THE OFFICER CORPS OF THE ARMED FORCES AS  
NECESSARY; ADMINISTRATION ALERTNESS FOR SIGNS OF PRO-  
COUP D'ETAT TENDENCIES; PERCEPTIONS OF PRESIDENT  
ALFONSIN OF SOURCES OF SUPPORT AND OF PROBLEMS IN THE  
ARMED FORCES

TEXT: 1. [REDACTED]

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E025x1

PAGE 3

S E C R E T

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[REDACTED] THE ALFONSIN ADMINISTRATION  
HAS EVERY INTENTION OF CONTINUING TO MAKE CHANGES IN SENIOR OFFICER  
ASSIGNMENTS IN THE ARMED FORCES (FFAA) WHENEVER IT DEEMS SUCH CHANGES  
NECESSARY. [REDACTED] PRESIDENT ALFONSIN, WHO --

[REDACTED] VERY MUCH WANTS TO HAVE THE FFAA COMPLETELY UNDER HIS  
CONTROL, SUPPORTED THE EARLY MARCH CHANGES IN KEY SENIOR FFAA ASSIGN-  
MENTS. [REDACTED] THE ADMINISTRATION IS ALERT FOR SIGNS OF TEN-  
DENCIES ON THE PART OF ANY OFFICERS THAT WOULD INDICATE SUPPORT FOR  
A COUP D'ETAT AND, DEPENDING ON THE EXTENT OF A POSSIBLE THREAT THAT  
AN OFFICER OR OFFICERS MIGHT POSE, IS PREPARED TO TRANSFER OR TO  
REMOVE THE OFFENDING OFFICER OR OFFICERS.

EO25x1

2. [REDACTED] AT THE TIME, PRESIDENT  
ALFONSIN BELIEVED HE HAS SUPPORT FROM THE AIR FORCE, FROM THE  
NAVY, AND -- IN THE ARMY -- FROM THE CAVALRY BRANCH. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] THE EARLY MARCH REASSIGNMENTS AND RETIREMENTS HAD CAUSED A  
HIGH DEGREE OF ANGER AND DISILLUSIONMENT AT THE COLONEL LEVEL AND  
THAT THE ADMINISTRATION SEE POTENTIAL PROBLEMS ARISING AMONG OF-

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FICERS AT THIS LEVEL.

EO25x1

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FOIA(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024(i)(1)  
Intelligence Sources and Methods

EO25x1 FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i)(1)  
Intelligence Sources and Methods

PAGE 2

S E C R E T

U N I N T E L

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REPORT CLASS S E C R E T U N I N T E L

DIST: 25 MARCH 1985

COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

SUBJ: CLAIMS THAT TWO RETIRED ARMY GENERAL OFFICERS HAVE A  
PLAN TO BRING PRESSURE ON AND ULTIMATELY TO REMOVE  
THE GOVERNMENT OF PRESIDENT RAUL ALFONSIN

E025x1




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EO25x1



TEXT: 1. [redacted]

PAGE 4

S C R E T

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A SECRET ELEVEN-POINT PLAN TO FORM A NATIONAL FRONT FOR TAKING ACTION AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF PRESIDENT RAÚL ALFONSÍN.

BUT HE DID NOT IDENTIFY ANY OF THESE INDIVIDUALS. HE SAID THAT THE NATIONAL FRONT HAS TWO GOALS: THE FIRST AND MORE IMMEDIATE OF WHICH, HE EXPLAINED, CONSISTS IN BRINGING PRESSURE ON THE ADMINISTRATION TO END ITS EFFORTS TO PROSECUTE ARMED FORCES (FFAA) PERSONNEL FOR ALLEGED ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES DURING THE COUNTERSUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGN. [REDACTED] THE SECOND AND LONGER TERM GOAL

4

PAGE 5

S E C R E T

WINTEL

WOULD INVOLVE THE REMOVAL OF THE ALFONSIN GOVERNMENT. HE ADDED  
THAT ACTIVITIES BASED ON [REDACTED] PLAN SHOULD BEGIN ABOUT  
2 APRIL 1985. [REDACTED]

BO25x1

3. [REDACTED] LISTED THE POINTS BELOW  
AS ACTION "AGREEMENTS" INCLUDED IN THE ELEVEN POINTS OF MENENDEZ'  
AND HIS PLAN:

- A. UNDERTAKING A JOINT EFFORT TO RAISE MONEY.
- B. SETTING UP A PARALLEL, BUT CLANDESTINE, JOINT GENERAL  
STAFF WHICH WOULD INCLUDE ACTIVE DUTY AND RETIRED OFFICERS.

C. UNIFYING AND COORDINATING [REDACTED] "ACTION GROUPS"  
OF ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL, WHO REMAIN LOYAL [REDACTED]  
WHICH WOULD BEGIN CONDUCTING OPERATIONS DESIGNED TO BRING PRESSURE

(6)

PAGE 6

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ON THE ALFONSIN GOVERNMENT. [REDACTED] THESE OPERATIONS  
WOULD INCLUDE THE BOMBING OF SELECTED TARGETS. HE MENTIONED  
SPECIFICALLY HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS AS AMONG THE SELECTED TARGETS,  
AND HE SAID OTHERS WOULD INCLUDE "ANTI-MILITARY" TARGETS.

EO25x1



D. LAUNCHING COORDINATED PROPAGANDA AND PSYCHOLOGICAL  
ACTIONS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT.

E. COORDINATING THE COLLECTION OF INFORMATION ON THE  
ALFONSIN ADMINISTRATION.

6

PAGE 7

S C R E T

WINTEL

F. AGREEING ON A COMMON STRATEGY FOR THE NEAR TERM.

5. ALSO EARLY IN THE WEEK OF 17 MARCH, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IS INVOLVED WITH

[REDACTED] POINTED OUT THAT THE

LONGER-TERM GOAL OF THE PLAN TO REMOVE THE ALFONSIN

GOVERNMENT WOULD INVOLVE CONSTITUTIONAL MEANS

IF POSSIBLE, OR A COUP D'ETAT IF NECESSARY.

[REDACTED] CLAIMED THAT THE NATIONAL FRONT HAS SUPPORT IN  
VARIOUS AREAS OF ARGENTINE SOCIETY. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HE IS IN CONSTANT CONTACT WITH CERTAIN ARGENTINE POLITICAL  
LEADERS, WHOM THE RETIRED GENERAL DID NOT NAME; WITH LEADERS  
OF INTERNATIONAL RIGHTIST GROUPS; WITH UNION LEADERS; WITH A  
POLITICAL GROUPING HEADED BY HERMINIO ~~X~~ (IGLESIAS)) AND JORGE  
~~X~~ (ARGENTO)); WITH ACTIVE DUTY AND RETIRED ARMED FORCES AND

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
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
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6.

THE

FOLLOWING POINTS ARE INCLUDED IN THE [REDACTED]

A. INITIATING A COORDINATED POLITICAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST  
MARXISM IN ARGENTINA.

B. USING "SPECIAL OPERATIONS ACTION GROUPS," AS THE OFFICER  
CALLED THEM, TO PROVOKE OR ENGINEER INCIDENTS DESIGNED TO  
EMBARRASS THE ALFONSIN GOVERNMENT AND TO DEMONSTRATE ITS WEAKNESS.

[REDACTED] THE OFFICER'S DESCRIPTION

OF THE MAKE-UP OF THE "SPECIAL ACTION GROUPS," THEY SEEM IDENTICAL  
WITH THE ACTION GROUPS MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 2C, ABOVE.)

C. UNDERTAKING A COORDINATED EFFORT TO GAIN THE SUPPORT

10

PAGE 4

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OF THE MAJORITY OF THE MAJOR FFAA COMMANDERS OR, IF THIS EFFORT FAILS, USING THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS ACTION GROUPS TO COMPROMISE THE COMMANDERS IN SUCH A MANNER THAT THEY WOULD FIND THEMSELVES WITH NO CHOICE OTHER THAN [REDACTED]

D. MAKING A COORDINATED EFFORT TO ENLIST THE SUPPORT OF A NUMBER OF UNION AND POLITICAL LEADERS. AGAIN, IF THIS EFFORT SHOULD FAIL, [REDACTED] WOULD TURN TO THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS

ACTION GROUPS FOR THE SAME PURPOSE AS DESCRIBED ABOVE.

B025x1

E. TRYING TO DEMONSTRATE TO VARIOUS SECTORS OF ARGENTINE SOCIETY, TO THE ADMINISTRATION, AND TO JUNIOR ARMED FORCES OFFICERS IN COMMAND POSITIONS THAT THE FFAA ARE UNIFIED.

F. SETTING UP A PARALLEL, BUT CLANDESTINE, JOINT STAFF ORGANIZATION WHICH WOULD HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR COORDINATED PROBLEM-SOLVING AND FOR DEVELOPING STRATEGY. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

11

PAGE 5 [REDACTED]

S E C R E T

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G. SETTING UP A PHYSICAL SECURITY SYSTEM TO PROTECT THE  
LEADERS OF THE NATIONAL FRONT.

H. COORDINATING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CONTACTS WITH  
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS THAT COULD ASSIST THE FRONT. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE FIRST TWO PRIORITIES IN REGARD TO THIS POINT INVOLVE  
THE SEEKING OF CONTACTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN WHAT HE CALLED  
"ANTI-MARXIST" COUNTRIES.

EO25x1

12

PAGE 6

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E025x1

13

PAGE 7

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IN THE GENERAL POPULATION.)

8. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THIS REPORT ON ANTI-GOVERNMENT PLOTTING APPEARS CREDIBLE. (SEE AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES TELEGRAM 02164 OF 20 MARCH 1985 IN WHICH FORMER PRESIDENT FRONDIZI REFERS TO THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH A FRONT.) WITH ALFONSINI'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TROUBLES MOUNTING, OPPOSITION FORCES ON THE NON-DEMOCRATIC RIGHT SENSE AN OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE THE OFFENSIVE WITH THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF UNSEATING THE RADICAL ADMINISTRATION. AT THIS POINT, THEY APPEAR TO LACK POPULAR SUPPORT AND THEIR ORGANIZATIONAL CAPABILITY TO IMPLEMENT THEIR AMBITIOUS PLANS IS UNTESTED. BUT, IF THE GOVERNMENT FAILS TO ACT MORE DECISIVELY IN COPING WITH THE NATION'S PROBLEMS AND THE LEVEL OF SOCIAL CONFLICTS SHARPLY ESCALATES, THEIR EFFORTS TO UNDERMINE THE GOVERNMENT COULD ADVANCE AND BECOME A GREATER THREAT TO ITS LONG-TERM SURVIVAL.)

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

FOIA(b) (3) - 50 USC  
3024(i)(1) - Intelligence  
Sources and Methods

14

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FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC  
3024(i)(1) - Intelligence  
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PAGE 2

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REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET UNINTEL~~

DIST: 29 MARCH 1985

COUNTRY: ARGENTINA/INTERNATIONAL

SUBJ: COMMENTS [REDACTED] ON EO25x1

THE EXISTENCE OF A DEVELOPING PLAN FOR THE REMOVAL OF  
PRESIDENT RAUL ALFONSIN; INTEREST OF THE PLANNERS  
IN CONTACT WITH THE U.S. GOVERNMENT



PAGE 3

S E C R E T

U N I T E D

THERE IS A PLAN DEVELOPING AMONG ARMED FORCES (FFAA) OFFICERS AND CIVILIAN NATIONALISTS,

FOR THE REMOVAL OF PRESIDENT RAUL

(ALFONSIN)

THESE OFFICERS AND THE NATIONALISTS ARE NOT TALKING AT THIS TIME ABOUT A COUP D'ETAT. [REDACTED] THE PEOPLE ASSOCIATED WITH THIS GROUP BELIEVE THAT THE DOMESTIC SITUATION IN ARGENTINA WILL BECOME PARTICULARLY TENSE OVER THE NEXT TWO TO THREE MONTHS, THAT THE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL POPULARITY WITH THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE WILL DROP MARKEDLY IN THIS SAME PERIOD, AND THAT ALFONSIN COULD THEN BE FORCED FROM OFFICE.

E025x1

2. [REDACTED] THE GROUP OF ARMED

FORCES OFFICERS AND CIVILIAN NATIONALISTS [REDACTED]

IS INTERESTED IN HAVING HIGH-LEVEL CONTACT WITH THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. [REDACTED] THIS GROUP IS PREDISPOSED TOWARD GOOD RELA-

PAGE 4 [REDACTED]

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TIONS WITH THE U.S. ON THE PART OF ANY GOVERNMENT FORMED IN THE  
POST-ALFONSIN PERIOD.

3. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE GROUP [REDACTED] MAY BE  
ONE OF SEVERAL GROUPS TALKING ABOUT THE REMOVAL OF PRESIDENT ALFON-  
SIN. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] RETIRED ARMY GENERALS RAMON X(CAMPOS) AND LUCIANO BENJAMIN  
X(MENENDEZ) ARE INVOLVED WITH A PLAN TO REMOVE THE PRESIDENT.

[REDACTED] JOSE ALFREDO MARTINEZ  
DE HOZ, A MINISTER OF ECONOMY IN THE FORMER ARMED FORCES GOVERNMENT,  
AND SOME ASSOCIATES ARE ALSO WORKING TOWARD THE REMOVAL OF THE AL-  
FONSIN GOVERNMENT.) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

BO25x1

4. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THIS IS YET ANOTHER INDICATION THAT WOULD-  
BE PLOTTERS ARE BECOMING MORE ACTIVE IN ANTICIPATION OF THE TENSIONS  
WHICH ARE LIKELY TO RESULT FROM THE DETERIORATING ECONOMIC SITUATION  
AND THE INTENSIFIED POLITICAL INFIGHTING IN PREPARATION FOR THE  
NOVEMBER ELECTIONS. AS THIS REPORT INDICATES, THOSE INTERESTED

ARGENTINA

PAGE 5

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
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Sources and Methods

IN UNSEATING ALFONSIN CAN BE EXPECTED TO APPROACH U.S. OFFICIALS  
LOOKING FOR ANY SIGNAL OR INDICATION THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT  
MIGHT WEAKEN IN ITS RESOLVE TO MAINTAIN ITS STRONG SUPPORT FOR  
THE DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED ALFONSIN GOVERNMENT.)



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
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
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REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET--WNITEL-~~

DIST: 21 FEB 85

COUNTRY: ARGENTINA/LIBYA

SUBJECT: PLANS OF THE EXTREME LEFTIST MONTONERO MOVEMENT  
TO RESTRUCTURE ITS ARMED CELLS; POSSIBLE COLLABOR-  
ATION AMONG MOVEMENT AND WORKERS' REVOLUTIONARY  
PARTY/REVOLUTIONARY ARMY OF THE PEOPLE INTELLECTUALS;  
INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE MONTONEROS AND  
PERONIST YOUTH

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- Intelligence Sources and  
Methods

EO25x1

PAGE 3

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SUMMARY:

[REDACTED] THE MONTONERO MOVEMENT IS UNDERTAKING A RESTRUCTURING OF ITS MILITARY CELLS. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE MOVEMENT MIGHT HAVE LIBYAN ASSISTANCE IN ITS EVENTUAL EFFORTS TO FORM A NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY.

INTELLECTUALS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WORKERS' PARTY/REVOLUTIONARY ARMY OF THE PEOPLE (PRT/ERP) MIGHT CONTRIBUTE TO A MOVEMENT MAGAZINE. [REDACTED] THE PERONIST YOUTH MOVEMENT.

IS DIVIDED INTO A LARGE NUMBER OF SMALL SPLINTER GROUPS WHICH FALL UNDER ONE OF THREE SECTORS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL, OF WHICH THE PERONIST YOUTH OF THE REGIONS HAS THE GREATEST MONTONERO CONNECTION.

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*Argentina*

[REDACTED]  
THE

[REDACTED] IB'S RESPOND DIRECTLY TO THE ORDERS OF DETAINED MONTONERO

PAGE 4

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LEADER MARIO ~~(FIRMENICH)~~. FIRMENICH'S

STATEMENTS THAT MONTONEROS MUST DEFEND PRESIDENT RAUL

~~(ALFONSIN)~~ TO THE DEATH AND MUST COMBAT THE PRO-COUP D'ETAT

ACTIVITIES OF PERONIST JUSTICIALIST PARTY (JP) LEADER HERMINIO

~~(IGLESIAS)~~ SERVE ONLY TO COVER THE MONTONEROS' TRUE PURPOSE

OF RESTRUCTURING THEIR MILITARY CELLS.

THE MONTONEROS WOULD BEGIN TO OPERATE MILITARILY AS SOON AS THE

GOVERNMENT AMNESTIES FIRMENICH AND THE LEADERS OF THE PRECEDING

ARMED FORCES (FFAA) GOVERNMENT, A MOVE WHICH THE MONTONEROS

EXPECT THE GOVERNMENT TO MAKE.

THE LIBYAN

PEOPLE'S BUREAU IN BUENOS AIRES WOULD NOT BE AGAINST HAVING CONTACT

WITH THE MONTONEROS THOROUGH OMAR ~~(LEWINGER)~~, THE MOVEMENT'S

CURRENT MILITARY CHIEF,

b025x1

2. THE PURPOSE OF THE MONTONERO MILITARY  
RESTRUCTURING WOULD CONSIST IN DEFENDING ~~ARGENTINA~~ AGAINST A  
COUP D'ETAT, WHICH THE MONTONEROS BELIEVE WILL TAKE PLACE IN

PAGE 5

[REDACTED] SECRET [REDACTED]

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1986 OR 1987. MEMBERS OF THE MOVEMENT THINK THAT A COUP D'ETAT WOULD PROVOKE CIVIL WAR AND THAT THE FFAA. WOULD BE DIVIDED IN THIS CIVIL WAR ALONG CLASS LINES. THE MONTONEROS, THEREFORE, PLAN TO HAVE WHAT THEY CALL A "NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY" ALONG THE LINES OF THE FORMER VIETNAMESE "VIETMINH," RATHER THAN A PURELY GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION.

THIS RESTRUCTURING OF THE MILITARY CELLS WOULD BE RELATIVELY EASY BECAUSE THE MONTONEROS HAVE SUFFICIENT MONEY IN FOREIGN BANK ACCOUNTS AND BECAUSE THEY COULD HAVE LIBYAN AID.

[REDACTED] CONSEQUENTLY, THE MOVEMENT WOULD NOT HAVE TO ENGAGE IN THE EXPROPRIATION OF CAPITAL AND THE RECUPERATION OF ARMS FOR THE PEOPLE.

EO25x1

3. [REDACTED] POSSIBILITY THAT INTELLECTUALS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WORKERS' PARTY/REVOLUTIONARY ARMY OF THE PEOPLE (PRT/ERP) MIGHT CONTRIBUTE TO THE MAGAZINE "LATINOAMERICA," *Argentina*, THE OFFICIAL MONTONERO JOURNAL DIRECTED BY RICARDO CURTEN) AND PRINTED LEGALLY BY THE COMPANY ~~MARTES, S.A.~~, WHICH ALSO PUBLISHES THE NEWSPAPER "LA VOZ." [REDACTED] COMMENT: THIS SIGNALS A CHANGE FROM THE SECTARIANISM PREVIOUSLY PRACTICED BY THE

PAGE 6

~~SECRET~~

~~UNINTEL~~

MONTONEROS WHEN THEIR PUBLICATIONS WERE PRINTED CLANDESTINELY.)  
ONE ~~(MARCA)~~ (FNU), A PRT/ERP FUNCTIONARY, AGREED TO CONTACT  
MIGUEL ~~(PUENTE)~~, AN EDITOR OF "LATINOAMERICA," IN ORDER TO  
PROVIDE MATERIAL TO HIM FOR PUBLICATION.

4. TURNING TO THE INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF THE PERONIST  
YOUTH MOVEMENT AND THE ROLE OF THE MONTONEROS IN THE PERONIST  
YOUTH (JP, "JUVENTUD PERONIST"), [REDACTED] A LARGE NUMBER  
OF SMALL SPLINTER GROUPS, SUCH AS THE PERONIST LIBERATION GROUPS  
(APL, "AGRUPACIONES PERONISTAS POR LA LIBERACION") IN THE FEDERAL  
CAPITAL (BUENOS AIRES CITY), FEDERALISM AND LIBERATION (FYL,  
"FEDERALISMO Y LIBERACION") IN CORDOBA, AND UNITY AND LIBERATION  
GROUPS (AUL, "AGRUPACIONES UNIDAD Y LIBERACION") IN ROSARIO ARE  
IN THE PERONIST YOUTH MOVEMENT. [REDACTED] AT THE NATIONAL  
LEVEL, THESE SPLINTER GROUPS FALL UNDER ONE OF THE THREE FOLLOWING  
SECTORS:

BO25x1

A. THE ~~UNIFIED PERONIST YOUTH (JPU, JUVENTUD PERONISTA  
UNEFRICADA)~~, HEADED BY PARTRICIA ~~(BULLRICH)~~ AND DANTE ~~(GULLO)~~).  
THE MAJORITY OF THE JPU'S LEADERS HAVE LONG-STANDING MONTONERO CON-

PAGE 7 [REDACTED]

SECRET [REDACTED]

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NECTIONS, ESPECIALLY THOSE RESPONDING TO THE LINE OF RODOLFO (GALIN-BERTI), WHO, ALONG WITH BULLRICH AND HER SISTER, BROKE WITH THE OFFICIAL MONTONERO LEADERSHIP IN 1978.

B. THE PERONIST INTRANSIGENCE AND MOBILIZATION (IMP, "INTRANSGIENCIA Y MOBILIZACION PERONISTA"), IS HEADED BY NILDA (GARRE) AND VICENTE (SAADI), JR. THE MONTONEROS HAVE ABANDONED THE IMP, AS HAVE THE NEWSPAPER, "LA VOZ," AND JUSTICIALIST PARTY NATIONAL SENATOR VICENTE SAADI, WHICH TWO LATTER NOW SUPPORT ALL THREE SECTORS EQUALLY. [REDACTED] COMMENT: IN THE PAST, "LA VOZ" AND SENATOR SAADI WERE VERY CLOSELY LINKED TO THE IMP FACTION OF THE PERONIST YOUTH. IN 1984, THE OWNERSHIP OF "LA VOZ" CHANGED HANDS AND THE SENATOR PUBLICLY RENOUNCED HIS ASSOCIATION WITH THE PERONIST LEFT, WHICH INCLUDES THE IMP. EVEN THOUGH "LA VOZ" AND SENATOR SAADI SUPPORT THE THREE MAIN Factions OF PERONIST YOUTH, THEY "ABANDONED" THE IMP BY BREAKING THEIR PREVIOUSLY CLOSE IDENTIFICATION AND ASSOCIATION WITH IT.)

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C. THE PERONIST YOUTH OF THE REGIONS IS LED BY FIRMANICH AND




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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

PAGE 2

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~~GUILLEPMO MARTINEZ~~, ~~AGUERA~~. THIS GROUP WAS PART OF THE IMP UNTIL JULY 1984, AT WHICH TIME IT BROKE AWAY BECAUSE GARRE ACCUSED ITS MEMBERS OF RECEIVING ORDERS FROM FIRMENICH. THE JPR HAS ITS HEADQUARTERS AT THE "CHACHO PENALOZA" UB, WHICH IS LOCATED AT ANTEQUERA AND ENTRE RIOS STREETS IN THE CONSTITUTION SECTION OF BUENOS AIRES CITY. AS OF MID-JANUARY 1985, THE JPR HAD 25 BASIC UNITS WHICH HAD BELONGED TO THE IMP, BUT WHICH BY THEN RESPONDED DIRECTLY TO FIRMENICH. IT HAS SUPPORT ONLY IN BUENOS AIRES CITY, CORDOBA, AND ROSARIO.

[REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED] THROUGH THE PERONIST YOUTH ORGANIZATION OF LA RIOJA PROVINCE AND THE JPR, FIRMENICH IS TRYING TO PROMOTE A MUTUAL SUPPORT AGREEMENT WITH ONE ((MENEM))

((FNU)), [REDACTED] [REDACTED] COMMENT: IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER, OF THE POLITICALLY PROMINENT MENEMS OF LA RIOJA PROVINCE, [REDACTED] MIGHT HAVE BEEN REFERRING TO SENATOR CARLOS ~~X~~ ((MENEM)) OR TO SENATOR EDUARDO ~~X~~ ((MENEM)).)

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PAGE 3

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